Mnemonic Insecurity: The German Struggle with New Trends of Radicalization by Reinke de Buitrago, Sybille
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Work licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non commercial-Share alike 
3.0 Italian License  
IdPS, ISSN: 2039-8573 - - Copyright © 2020 - Author 
 
 
Interdisciplinary Political Studies 
http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/idps   
ISSN: 2039-8573 (electronic version) 
 
IdPS, Issue 6(1) 2020: 21-49 
DOI: 10.1285/i20398573v6n1p21 
Published: July 15, 2020 
 
RESEARCH ARTICLE 
 
Mnemonic Insecurity: The German Struggle with New 
Trends of Radicalization  
 
Sybille Reinke de Buitrago 
PolAk Nds & IFSH 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The so-called refugee crisis of the last years has presented Germany with a massive inflow of refugees 
and migrants. The scale has disrupted Germany’s self-narrative as open and tolerant state that has 
learned from its Nazi past. With local and national institutions not being prepared logistically, 
with media images portraying a nearly ‘overrun’ country, and with a significant upsurge in anti-
migrant sentiments, a state of mnemonic insecurity has developed in Germany. Far-right political 
movements gathered strength and voter support, and right-wing extremist violence increased. On the 
other side, many people actively engaged in a ‘welcome culture’. The contribution traces key devel-
opments in Germany’s approach to the refugee crisis in the context of radicalization trends. It illus-
trates the dislocation of Germany’s identity and self-narrative in an emotionalized discourse, and 
the following acts to defend memory. It closes with current attempts at memory’s re-politicization to 
something larger than before. 
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1. Introduction 
How vulnerable is German identity? How has the drastic rise in refugee and 
migration flows and a following radicalization affected German identity and self-
narrative? The article argues that German memory has become challenged and 
German identity dislocated, creating mnemonic insecurity.  
The so-called refugee crisis of the last few years, with highest point around 
2015–2016, has ruptured Germany’s self-narrative of an open and tolerant state, one 
which has learned the lessons from its Nazi past. With local and national institu-
tions seeming logistically ill prepared, with media showing images of a country near-
ly ‘overrun’, and with a significant rise in anti-migrant sentiments, Germany devel-
oped a state of mnemonic insecurity. Language and political demands became more 
polarized and extreme, and far-right political movements gathered strength. From 
2014 to 2017, there was a new rise in violence by right-wing extremists (BMI 2019, 
p. 3), mainly against asylum seekers and migrants and those seen as helping them. 
Attacks on housing centers for asylum seekers rose by about 500% from before 
2014 to the highest in 2016 (BMI 2019, p. 7). Anti-Semitic violence increased by 
19.6% from 2017 to 2018 (BMI 2019, p. 5), with a first upsurge already in 2016 
(Groll 2019). The instances of violence by Muslim asylum seekers against Germans, 
particularly Muslim men against German women, were heavily exploited in right-
wing extremist and populist narratives (Fleischhauer 2015). At the same time, many 
people were helping refugees and migrants as part of the “welcome culture”. Ger-
man authorities reacted by both tightening laws to restrict migration and improving 
integration measures for those with (likely) asylum status. It took a few years, how-
ever, for a united and decided rejection of the incitement, polarization attempts and 
violence by populists and extremists. 
In post-1945, the German self-narrative as open and tolerant state which has 
learned from its Nazi past has been frequently and repeatedly activated in acts of 
historical remembrance across society and politics. The need to learn from the hor-
rors of National Socialism – and never to allow such horrors to occur again – are 
part of German discourse. Germany’s special responsibility (besondere Verantwortung) 
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is a constant evocation. This self-narrative, however, always had tensions: parts of 
German society post-1945 continued to show anti-foreign sentiment, and even a 
continuing glorification of Nazism and desires for revindication. The Gastarbeiter 
(guest workers) coming to Germany from the mid-1950s on, mainly from Greece, 
Italy, Spain and Turkey, often faced xenophobia (Der Spiegel 1973). Fears of “un-
controlled movement” were particularly pertinent already then (Vollmer & 
Karakayali 2018). Post-Cold War re-unified Germany experienced xenophobia, 
islamophobia, and racism, too (Ramm 2010; Boulila & Carri 2017; Vollmer & 
Karakayali 2018). While we should also note the different ways of dealing with the 
Nazi past in Eastern and Western Germany, the dominant official narrative on both 
sides was one of having become an open, tolerant, democratic and/or new society 
and state where there is no place for political extremism and violence. The great 
majority of public and political discourse has presented a German self-narrative and 
identity as cleansed from the horrors of National Socialism and as re-integrated into 
the community of liberal, democratic states. The refugee crisis has illustrated the 
continuing tensions in this self-narrative and identity.  
The contribution traces the key developments of the radicalization of parts 
of German discourse during the refugee crisis.1 It concentrates on how Germany 
has dealt and is dealing with the refugee crisis and grown migration, in light of in-
creased radicalization and populism in Germany. It illustrates aspects of the socie-
tal-political struggle, the dislocation of Germany’s identity and self-narrative, and 
the emotionalization in narratives. In closing, the contribution shows the steps tak-
en up until now towards defending and re-politicizing memory for mnemonic secu-
rity, and thereby strengthening ontological security.  
 
2. Identity, Emotions, and Crises in the Context of Radicalization 
Before presenting empirical insights regarding Germany’s identity and self-
narrative, this section introduces the important role of identity, emotions, and crises 
 
1 The article builds in part on results of the project VIDEOSTAR – Video-based Strategies against 
Radicalization, extending to the concept of mnemonic memory. The project is funded by the Inter-
nal Security Fund of the European Union. 
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in the context of radicalization, as well as mnemonic security and ontological securi-
ty. Identity and, at the level of states, national identity, are constructed and social-
ized in experience with others. Scholars highlight the role of identity and of emo-
tional needs, as well as how extremists attempt fulfill these with their narratives 
(Cottee & Hayward 2011, p. 963; Barrelle 2014; Neumann 2016, p. 64). It thus mat-
ters in the context of radicalization, how both Self and Other, and their relations, 
are represented and how such representations either confirm or reject particular as-
pects of identity and the emotional links (Mercer 2014, p. 522, 530). Self-other con-
structions and the elements of difference they contain are part of human under-
standing and interaction. Yet, self-other constructions can also come to include ex-
aggerated difference, the purposeful enlargement of dichotomies, and the applica-
tion of hierarchies with elements of superiority regarding the Self and of inferiority 
regarding the Other. Recent work discusses the interplay of identity and alterity, dif-
ference and othering practices in several case studies (Reinke de Buitrago & 
Resende 2019).  
Without emotional appeal, extremists could not get their messages across. 
Emotions play a key role in radicalization narratives. Scholars highlight that emo-
tions are part of our thinking, directly and indirectly shaping social behavior. Emo-
tions are inseparable from cognition and action, for humans rely on and use emo-
tions to understand the world and to act in it in relation to others (Bially Mattern 
2014, p. 590-591; Mercer 2014). Extremist groups exploit emotional needs of be-
longing, and their narratives include up- and de-valuation, thereby creating cohesion 
towards the inside/Self, but difference and otherness towards the outside/Other(s). 
Extremists reject the identity of those they speak against and offer their own identi-
ty instead. Identity re-constructions can take place by rejecting the identity that 
connects an individual to mainstream society, and then offering the identity of the 
extremist group.  
Times of crisis can also lead to identity re-construction. Crises often rupture 
held ideas, foster struggles among dominant, alternative and new ideas, and thereby 
unsettle current narratives. Such a socio-political struggle for meaning can then also 
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unsettle identity and create space for new links and constructions. According to 
Nabers (2016), crises can motivate social change and dislocate identity. When a 
dominant discourse loses its ability to explain, it produces a crisis in held meaning 
(Legro 2000, p. 424; Laclau 2005, p. 122). The dislocation of a discourse is always 
possible (Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000, p. 15), because hegemonic articulations are 
contingent and precarious (Laclau 1993, p. 283). Political crises can thus create 
voids of meaning, which the dominant actors fill with new meaning (Nabers 2009). 
In fact, political actors compete to establish their particular interpretations and rep-
resentations as dominant. When these new ideas have become identified with, nor-
malized and institutionalized (Nabers 2015, p. 147), the new narratives can become 
dominant.  
When a crisis dislocates identity, however, ontological security can be at risk. 
Ontological security describes a state of being where the Self feels secure in its sur-
roundings, with some degree of order and continuity (Giddens 1991). Ontological 
security is part of identity construction and constantly challenged by elements of 
foreignness and difference, and resulting feelings of insecurity (Cash & Kinnvall 
2017, p. 269-270). States too need ontological security, and national decision makers 
engage in efforts and practices to build and maintain a positive view of Self and na-
tional identity (see for example Mitzen 2006; Steele 2008; Croft 2012). For the 
state’s Self to be “internally cohesive”, also the “mnemonic vision of itself and its 
place in the world” must be coherent (Mälksoo 2015, p. 224). To maintain a stable 
and continuous sense of Self and of “the Self of a state”, state agents engage in 
“collecting the history of a nation-state into a story that informs current actions” 
(Steele 2008, p. 20). These efforts aim at mnemonic security, which is linked to as 
well as enables ontological security. A secure self-narrative and memory allows for a 
secure sense of Self and identity; a secure sense of Self can in turn stabilize a coher-
ent memory and constructive memory work. 
Memory efforts though have their pitfalls, particularly when security needs 
gain too much weight. Mälksoo (2015, p. 222) points to significant consequences 
when states argue their ontological security. The security lens then covers questions 
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beyond those of physical survival; state identity becomes more fully linked with se-
curity, raising the importance of national memory; and the sovereign states’ security 
dominates politics. Security then appears as most important value to pursue 
(Mälksoo 2015, p. 224). Memory thus is political. Collective memory then is a pro-
cess of contestation, a struggle over memory by policy makers and other groups, 
and a struggle over which policies to pursue (Becker 2014). Acts, practices, rituals, 
and symbols serve to maintain a national memory, a process called mnemonic re-
construction (Vivian 2010). Political actors may also use such materialized represen-
tations to construct boundaries and to sharpen the sense of difference between Self 
and Other (Cash & Kinnvall 2017, p. 269). Political actors can furthermore foster 
adaptations of memory by introducing new ideas. National memory thus shapes a 
state’s self-narrative (Mälksoo 2015, p. 222). However, when actors apply ontologi-
cal security to memory, memory itself can become a question of a secure Self, and 
may then shape ensuing action to the detriment of other societal domains or other 
actors (Mälksoo 2015, p. 224). New security dilemmas and entanglements may re-
sult, including new demands to secure identity within a security frame (Mitzen 
2006). Therefore, when a state’s memory is (seen as) endangered and insecure – as 
mnemonic insecurity – the form of its re-stabilization can create new problems. As 
alternative, Mälksoo (2010) points to the potential gain from seeing identity as 
open-ended and constantly becoming, to avoid problematic consequences and en-
tanglements.  
Turning to Germany, we observe a country trying to find its role – and to 
adapt its identity – in response to a world with new challenges and demands. For 
Karp (2018, p. 59), the case of Germany illustrates well the “interaction between a 
national self-narrative and a rapidly changing environment”, the “ontological anxie-
ty” caused, and the strains and adaptation needs in order to secure identity. The 
growing calls for German leadership in the world strain German self-narrative and 
challenge the reluctance to lead. The German struggle to respond involves adapta-
tions in discourse and behavior to satisfy both mnemonic security and ontological 
security needs in the context of new challenges and grown responsibilities. We thus 
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see “a determined effort by German leaders to position the country between a tradi-
tional culture of restraint that can no longer meet Germany’s responsibilities and a 
position of hegemony that speaks of self-serving behavior and dominance” (Karp 
2018, p. 59). In trying to maintain “cognitive order” (Mitzen 2006, p. 346), Germa-
ny adjusted its identity to fit the new conditions; this new identity was, however, 
what Mitzen (2006, p. 347) calls a “second best” identity, a compromise of its goals 
and self-narrative, and the new context. As of now, German leaders are still at-
tempting to balance the response to ally demands with their public’s reluctance to 
follow (Karp 2018, p. 75).  
In German national memory, WWII and National Socialism with its horrors 
likely figure as the dominant events in the 20th century. Another defining event, 
though to a lesser degree, is WWI, and on the positive side the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and German re-unification in 1989 and 1990, respectively. As pointed out, sig-
nificant events such as catastrophes and other events of broad impact weigh on 
memory and can motivate adaptations (see for example Zerubavel 2003). German 
memory work focuses mostly on the time of National Socialism, via continuing 
public and political debates, memorial sites, exhibitions, and other means. Scholars 
also point to a renewed strengthening of memory work after re-unification, but also 
certain normalization trends (see for example Wittlinger & Larose 2007; 
Langenbacher 2010). The question of how to remember German history remains a 
societal and political debate, highlighted again in recent years. New radicalization 
trends in the course of the so-called refugee crisis challenge German mnemonic se-
curity and, thus, ontological security. Rising populism, an enormous upsurge in 
online hatred, and the acts of violence against migrants and refugees, as well as 
against Jewish people, have unsettled the German sense of Self and self-narrative. 
The country that thought to have become an open and tolerant state and society 
had to face the still existing xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism, and the fact that 
those voices were growing louder and gaining broader support.  
A few words on the phenomenon of radicalization serve as context here. 
Radicalization has many social and political facets, and no agreed definition. Some 
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have criticized this definitional plethora (Hoeft 2015; Ducol et al. 2018), as it hin-
ders an effective management. For the purpose of guidance, this article understands 
radicalization as a process that can take various forms. It may be relatively quick or 
more long-term, and often involves multiple aspects such as instabilities in personal 
and social identity, certain personality types, lacking feelings of belonging, group 
pressure, social surrounding and family influence, and to a lesser part lack of educa-
tion or economic means (Hussain 2018, p. 88-95). There may or may not be a per-
ception of the need to defend one’s own religion (Ahmed 2016). In radicalization 
processes, thinking and behavior become more limited and extreme and thus more 
removed from average views of a society; they then can also evolve to include vio-
lence (Neumann 2013c, p. 874; Neumann 2013b, p. 3).  
To understand radicalization processes, we need to highlight the involved 
narratives, and the role of media. Narratives illustrate the self-image and the held 
ideas for how to fulfill one’s aims; they “create coherence and order” by defining 
meaning (Steele 2008, p. 20, 58). A narrative is “a strategic story”, “the telling of a 
story in a certain way for a certain purpose … [namely] influence” (Ricks 2015). In 
the spreading of extremist narratives, social media play a key role today. Extremists 
actively use social media, in open and closed channels, to convey their ideas and 
spread their ideologies, to connect and network, recruit followers, and mobilize, 
even though offline contact remains important. Some scholars see online media of-
fering an entirely new dimension of propaganda: after actors have initiated debates, 
both excitement and interest can be kept on a high level (Neumann 2013a, p. 434). 
Communication in real-time and global space, and the offering of content according 
to user preferences, effectively draw attention to certain messages (Baaken & Schle-
gel 2017, p. 187-188). Extremists build and offer strategically crafted narratives that 
link up with existing tensions in a society, with people’s concerns and their ex-
pressed views (Milton 2016; Neumann 2016, p. 84-85). Part of the framing and ad-
dressing is highly emotional. Extremists attempt to both evoke emotions and appeal 
to identity. The rejection of the Other is combined with offers of belonging to con-
vince or create interest, and to strengthen both the internal cohesion and the differ-
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entiation to the outside group and threatening Other. The emotionalization of Self 
and Other is a key tool to make one’s own group appear superior, and the Other in-
ferior and threatening (see also Reinke de Buitrago 2018), which is why speakers 
purposefully and strategically emotionalize narratives. The effect of online radicali-
zation narratives is visible in actual violence (Laub 2019), illustrating the need to at-
tend to these narratives and their dynamics. 
 
3. Unsettling German Self-Narrative: Mnemonic Insecurity and Ontological 
Security 
The refugee crisis motivated developments in Germany that culminated in a 
crisis of identity, self-narrative and memory. Populism rose significantly. Language 
and demands showed a polarization and more extreme elements, in turn resulting in 
actual violence. There was a new quality in the radicalization of the right-wing spec-
trum. Old and new groups voiced their hatred louder and engaged in violence 
against asylum seekers and migrants, but also against those who publicly supported 
migration and the assistance of refugees. In addition, articulations of sentiments 
against Jewish people in Germany grew significantly, and incidents and attacks 
against Jewish people and institutions increased – something that the German state 
and society collectively thought overcome. 
On the political side, the awakening to the new, more radical reality in Ger-
many was rather slow. At first, some local and state politicians spoke out against the 
hatred and violence. In particular, the violence against Jewish institutions garnered 
attention. Violence against migrants and refugees rose further and gained more me-
dia attention in the last years. Even in the thought-to-be tolerant midst of society, 
social media discussions heated up, too. Finally, the focus on right-wing extremist 
violence grew: politicians began to condemn the acts of violence strongly, but also 
the narratives of hate and polarization behind. Overall, it took several years until 
politicians positioned together broadly and clearly against the rising populism and 
right-wing extremist violence. We may place the clearer positioning in part also in 
the context and aftermath of the murder of the state politician Walter Lübcke by a 
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person afterwards discovered to be a right-wing fanatic in 2019. Significant as well 
was the unexpected strength of the right-wing nationalist/populist party AfD (Al-
ternative für Deutschland) which gained support in state elections of three eastern 
Bundesländer within several months of each other in 2019. Furthermore, in October 
2019, on the day of Yom Kippur, a right-wing fanatic attempted to shoot Jewish 
prayers in a synagogue in Halle, an act he had announced before on social media. 
These developments uncovered the depth of xenophobic, anti-migration, and anti-
Semitic sentiments lingering within German society. They illustrated how easily 
those sentiments could be re-activated, and what could be the consequences. Con-
tradictions to Germany self-narrative as tolerant society became more visible, chal-
lenging mnemonic security, and thereby ontological security. Accompanying the 
growing societal and political debate was the aftermath of the NSU (National Socialist 
Underground/Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund) crimes, namely of authorities having 
failed to act in time, and the legal proceedings against the last living NSU member 
that lasted from 2013 to 2018. The debate around this trial illustrated the difference 
in views and practices towards right-wing extremism in Germany. Civil society 
played an important role in stirring politicians to take a clear position against hatred 
and violence. Not only did many people in Germany organize against extremism 
and intolerance, they also engaged in assisting refugees and migrants. Civil society 
began to lobby strongly for refugee and migrant rights. In this, we may also see as a 
move towards defending or strengthening again mnemonic security. 
 
3.1. The Radicalization of German Discourse  
From the end of 2014 on, but particularly in the summer of 2015, the refu-
gee crisis reached a scale that state authorities and the public alike could no longer 
ignore. The process of unsettling German self-narrative and memory began around 
this time. Although media had been actively reporting on a rising refugee crisis, 
where particularly the Italian state had demanded help from its European partners, 
there was not much more than some political statements on the general need to find 
a European solution. Most EU countries continued to rely on the Dublin Agree-
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ment, outlining that refugees had to register and stay in the country of first arrival. 
The request of the German chancellor Merkel in 2015 for a European-wide migra-
tion policy did not lead to any truly joint or effective answers. Special meetings at 
the EU level took place; the European Council meeting in April 2015 led to an 
agreement on an overall strategy that included measures for improved rescue at sea, 
the fighting of human trafficking, and more cooperation with countries of origin 
and within the EU. The measure that found most agreement was the strengthening 
of border patrol at Europe’s southern border, mainly via strengthening FRONTEX 
(European Border and Coast Guard Agency). However, with enormous numbers of refu-
gees and migrants continuing to arrive, border patrol alone was insufficient. In addi-
tion, Italy had begun to let refugees and migrants transit to other countries; Austria 
did so as well, leading to unseen numbers of refugees and migrants entering Ger-
many, many of them without being registered. To a significant extent, the German 
state had no knowledge about who had actually entered the country, and state offi-
cials and local communities were often overwhelmed by the logistic and financial 
needs of providing shelter and assistance. Perhaps of key impact were the often 
heart-breaking pictures of the plight of refugees and migrants presented in media, 
the daily reporting of drownings in the Mediterranean Sea, and the desperation at 
the borders of European states, along with refugees who had arrived and told their 
story. Not only was there an emotional framing by media or NGOs and other activ-
ists, the pictures and experiences of refugees themselves were highly emotional and 
they moved a great part of German society and policymakers alike. The key contra-
diction to German self-narrative and identity was how Germany could turn its face 
from such human plight, with own experiences of flight and human suffering and 
the experience of the Nazi horrors. In the light of German history, these images be-
gan to unsettle German memory and cause mnemonic insecurity, and people began 
to question if Germany was as tolerant and open as thought, pointing the finger in 
the lingering historical wounds. 
As many Germans began to engage in the assistance of refugees and mi-
grants, also anti-foreign sentiments began to rise. On the one side, a great part of 
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the population was helping to cover needs of hundreds of thousands incomers. 
Germans offered all kinds of assistance, including donating, the sorting of clothing 
and other goods, help with the filling out of forms or with visits to government and 
public offices, giving German lessons and even shelter in their own homes. The in-
ternationally highly applauded welcome culture was strong. These efforts also be-
came part of media reporting. On the other side, however, many began to feel anx-
ious regarding the number of refugees and migrants coming to Germany, and if 
Germany could really handle it, as Merkel had claimed in 2015. By mid-2016, a re-
port showed that Germany had already taken in many more refugees than any other 
European country (Zeit Online 2016). With state and local institutions frequently 
being overwhelmed, these rising concerns and anxieties remained insufficiently ad-
dressed. The welcome culture significantly weakened already in 2016 (Zick & Preuß 
2016). By then, most Germans still considered integration generally as positive but 
had strong reservations; most were also against further refugees and migrants enter-
ing the country. The above study also showed increases in the numbers of people 
fearing the loss of German values, and more frequent terror attacks, as well as those 
demanding the refugees’ return after an improved situation in their home countries. 
At the European level, most thought that particularly Muslims do not want to inte-
grate in their new home societies but remain distinct (Wike et al. 2016).  
German mainstream political discourse had centered on the integration of 
refugees and migrants. The drowning of three-year old Syrian boy, Aylan Kurdi, in 
the Mediterranean Sea in 2015 caused so much criticism of the European refugee 
policy, also via media pressure, that the Dublin agreement was temporarily suspend-
ed. Many in Germany came to see the European migration policy as inhumane, and 
as not fitting with a German self-narrative of an open state and society. On the oth-
er side, incidents by refugees/migrants against German women, for example the 
events at Cologne central station at New Year’s Eve 2015/2016, created resentment 
and increased the demands for security. For that night, more than 1000 incidents of 
mostly sexual assault against women by persons described as migrant/non-German 
were reported; police were unprepared. Questions of who was actually entering the 
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country became louder. In addition, a Europol report from July 2016 warned of 
hundreds of potential terrorists having entered Europe, as foreign fighters returning 
from Syria and Iraq. The Christmas market attack in Berlin in December 2016 by a 
Tunisian with potential links to the terror network ISIS/Daesh, killing 12 people 
and injuring 55, was another event that shaped views and discourse. Thus, mne-
monic insecurity in Germany resulted in two ways. On the one hand, the contradic-
tion between the German self-narrative as open and tolerant, and the perceived and 
argued lack to respond to such a humanitarian crisis became impossible to ignore. 
On the other hand, incidents of violence by migrants and/or refugees in Germany 
strengthened voices that were critical of migration, including extremist ones, which 
also contradicted the German self-narrative.  
Main voices in the radicalization of German discourse are the German far-
right movement PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des 
Abendlandes/Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident), and the 
AfD. PEGIDA, claiming a decline of European/Western civilization, culture and 
values, emerged in Germany in the fall of 2014. The name of the movement illus-
trates the misuse of the term of Abendland (occident) for political objectives; the 
term facilitates a dichotomy between Abendland and Morgenland (Orient). As some 
point out, this was already part of the illiberal ideology of Germany between WWI 
and WWII (Conze 2005). PEGIDA grew significantly and formed local offshoots. 
The now quite strong, right-wing nationalist/populist party AfD actively 
played on and utilized rising anti-foreign sentiments and anxieties for its aims. 
Founded initially on an EU-critical and right-wing-liberal platform in 2013, it has 
turned into the key political force against further migration and against foreigners 
overall. Despite some diversity of views and continuing internal struggles over fu-
ture direction, AfD discourse is strongly populist and in part extremist. Since early 
2020, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz) is seeing a part of the AfD as case of observation (Beobachtung). A 
key practice of the AfD is to build and strengthen polarization, dichotomies, and 
resentment, and to play on anxieties. AfD representatives continuously misuse the 
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differences that people feel between themselves and foreigners, and the concerns of 
people over what the changes may bring. They represent refugees and migrants as 
people living off the German social system, never having contributed, and thus liv-
ing off the work and achievements of Germans, in contrast to the German pen-
sioners who are forced to go through trash to survive (Farle 2018, translated). The 
refugees and migrants in “this mass migration” are portrayed as “destroying Ger-
many” and its future (Farle 2018, translated). It is of further significance that the 
AfD also denigrates the German state for allowing such ‘danger’ to develop. 
AfD narratives paint and degrade chancellor Merkel’s decision to keep the 
border to Austria open on 4 September 2015, as thousands of refugees marched to 
enter Germany, as enormous “breach of law” supported by most of the govern-
ment. The government is said to “have allowed that terrorists […], that such IS 
fighters come into our country”, and that parallel societies form that “threaten the 
people in our country” (Farle 2018, translated). Narratives criticize and denigrate 
the state and the media for pushing and assisting migration, for allowing “chaos” to 
occur at German borders, and for risking the German Heimat and culture. Germany 
is said to need sensible and patriotic politicians who love their country and the 
German Volk; “for this we stand here, and we will protest until that is reached” 
(Stürzenberger 2016, translated). AfD narratives not only reject refugees and mi-
grants overall, but also the German authorities who have not prevented it; the 
German state and government thus become a target as well. The rising protests by 
AfD, PEGIDA and other groups illustrate that a growing number of people began 
to believe such narratives. The ease with which such feelings of insecurity and re-
sentment could be activated for political aims contrary to the German self-narrative 
points to mnemonic insecurity growing.  
The active pitting of the claimed-as-superior German culture against the 
“archaic culture” of Muslim refugees evoke identity and emotions. According to 
AfD speakers, “archaic” norms and behavior are threatening German identity as 
part of Western democratic civilization and culture (Farle 2018, translated). A num-
ber of AfD figures stand out in their phrasing of the supposed threat by refu-
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gees/migrants to Germany and Germans. For example, Alice Weidel, co-chair of 
the AfD Bundestag parliamentary group, continues to paint a picture of “Burkas! 
Headscarf girls! Men with knifes who receive alimentation! And others who are 
good for nothing” (Weidel 2018, translated). In 2015, Björn Höcke, the ultra-right 
chair of the AfD parliamentary group of Thuringia spoke of Germany’s thousand-
year old past and of wanting a thousand-year old future for Germany (referring to 
the Nazi term tausendjähriges Reich) (Höcke 2015-2019, translated). He warns: “The 
Syrian who comes to us still has his Syria. The Afghan who comes to us still has his 
Afghanistan. And the Senegalese who comes to us still has his Senegal. When we 
will have lost our Germany, we will have no home anymore”. He paints a picture of 
threat and urgency: “social peace is existentially threatened by the rising misuse and 
the giving up of the nationally limited solidarity community, as well as by the import 
of foreign peoples and the necessarily resulting conflicts” (Höcke 2015-2019, trans-
lated). He claims that in the large West German cities, Germans are already the mi-
nority and are losing their home (Höcke 2015-2019, translated). The theme is one 
of Germans becoming strangers in their own country, of the German state being 
overwhelmed, and Germany as country and culture threatened by outside foreigners 
and by refugees/migrants inside Germany. The dominant means, or practice, is, 
again, to build on and enlarge both the concerns in the midst of society and the 
anxieties of some, and to stoke fear, unease, and resentment. AfD representatives 
depict the refugee/migrant as threatening, archaic/non-modern and inferior, trying 
to appeal to superiority feelings and identity of the Self, and making the refu-
gee/migrant the scapegoat for all problems. Part of how the AfD goes about this is 
to give topics an emotional framing and to emotionalize Self/Other.  
Narratives of right-wing extremists/populists overall focus heavily on refu-
gees and migration, the claimed threat from migration to Europe and Germany, and 
from an “Islamization”. Populists and extremists alike take up the concerns ex-
pressed in media, as part of a strategy and practice to connect to the society’s main-
stream, to shift discourse and politics, and gain followers. They represent particular-
ly the Muslim refugees and migrants as the threatening Other, and they use the 
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frame of a claimed Islamization to depict the danger to Western liberal societies and 
values. Narratives warn that Islamic values are already changing European societies, 
and that Europeans and Germans will soon feel as strangers in their own land. A 
linked theme is the claimed threat to German women from Muslim men. In this 
context, narratives repeatedly refer to the events at Cologne central station at New 
Year’s Eve 2015/2016. Right-wing extremists/populists present this incident as key 
“evidence” of German authorities and government being unable and unwilling to 
protect German women. The German government receives further blame for sup-
posedly pushing an experiment of Multikulti (multiculturalism), and for the resulting 
conflicts and violence from which Germans already suffer. The claim is that the 
German state acts against its own people.  
In narratives, the practice is thus to distort issues and developments, to 
paint a growing threat and create a sense of urgency, and to try to capitalize on dif-
fuse fears in society. Rhetorical/stylistic means serve to increase anxiety. For exam-
ple, there is a distortion of words relating to scale and size in order to paint a grow-
ing threat, but also to support the claim of rising resistance of Germans. Framings 
are emotional; the aim is to evoke viewers emotionally and thereby mobilize them. 
Videos on YouTube often depict the Self as quite normal, sympathetic young peo-
ple, to ease viewer identification, and the dangerous Other in stark contrast. The 
technique of building and increasing contrast, for example when depicting a calm 
and peaceful Germany against enormous treks of refugees arriving, serves viewer 
emotionalization and mobilization. We may argue that the AfD and others like it at-
tempt to move society away from the previous consensus and self-narrative, and to 
affect respective political change. In painting a picture of threat and evoking securi-
ty, they – in Mälksoo’s view – contribute to mnemonic insecurity and destabilize the 
German self-understanding.  
While there were also voices that reminded of the German experience of 
flight during and after WWII (Scholz 2016), the anti-refugee/migrant/foreigner 
narratives became more prominent. Accompanying this change, violence against 
refugees, asylum seekers and migrants rose, as stated above, and public figures suf-
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fered attacks, too. The German self-narrative and identity as tolerant state that has 
learned its lessons had become challenged. 
 
3.2. Creating Mnemonic Insecurity in Germany 
The representation of refugees and migrants as threat to European and 
German societies, citizens, and cultures has created anxieties and unease in Germa-
ny, and facilitated counteractions. These include the significant strengthening of 
right-wing extremist/populist forces in Germany, but also violence against refugees 
and migrants and those publicly supporting migration, sentiments against refugees 
and migrants, and a higher public rejection of further asylum seekers and of migra-
tion. German self-narrative and identity as tolerant state was dislocated; mnemonic 
insecurity has, if not always existing in a small part post-1945, increased. For a sig-
nificant number of people, memory is unsettled. Mnemonic insecurity though has 
come about in two ways. On the one side, the challenge to the German self-
narrative as open and tolerant state came from the refugee crisis and the involved 
humanitarian need, and the lacking or insufficient response to this need. For some, 
the self-narrative was no longer sustainable. On the other side, rising right-wing 
populism and extremism, and their rejection of the refugee/migrant as the threaten-
ing Other would not fit into the German self-narrative and thus led to its question-
ing. German society and politics are currently facing an intense and emotional 
struggle over the meaning of German national memory past and present. Memory 
of National Socialism and its assessment up until now, and the resulting responsibil-
ity for the German state and society face a significant challenge. The practices of en-
larging difference, playing on anxieties and fostering resentment by populists and 
extremists – part of a continuing struggle over memory, and how it should define 
political behavior – currently polarize society and politics. 
One way in which mnemonic insecurity resulted was the refugee crisis and 
the response to it not fitting German self-narrative, in the eyes of many. Heavily 
criticized by right-wing populists/extremists, German media continued to present 
pictures of the long refugee treks in the daily news, as well as in-depth reports on 
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refugees and migrants. NGO lobbying increased further, as well as rescue at sea in 
the Mediterranean by NGOs or private persons. The often highly emotional pic-
tures and reporting showed the plight of refugees on the one side and the rich, Eu-
ropean countries claiming the protection of human rights but not acting enough on 
the other side. This sharp contrast was daily visualized and discussed in media and 
politics, highlighting the contradiction between the German self-narrative of toler-
ance and the lack of solid and effective aid. In light of the German history of Na-
tional Socialism, of own experience of flight, and what this meant for today’s Ger-
many, mnemonic insecurity developed. This unsettling of memory began to scrape 
at the sense of Self, risking also ontological security.  
The other way of creating mnemonic insecurity was more purposeful. Politi-
cal discourse referring to Germany’s thousand-year old past for a thousand-year old 
future, as stated above, illustrates the distorted glorification of Germany’s Nazi past 
by some, but also how such views are somewhat normalized, in opposition to Ger-
man self-narrative and memory. It was societal and political understanding that 
post-1945 Germany would never again go down such a path, but right-wing extrem-
ist/populist groups have actively questioned this dictum and moved their narratives 
towards the midst of society (Mitte der Gesellschaft). Part of the understanding was 
Germany’s special responsibility towards other countries due to its history. Howev-
er, this understanding has weakened in the last few years. Thus, the number of 
Germans agreeing with Germany’s special responsibility towards Israel and Jewish 
people decreased since 2015. Germans are generally aware of the growing anti-
Semitism and they link it to the political success of right-wing extremist/populist 
parties (Jeder 2019). The number of people agreeing with Germany’s special re-
sponsibility to help other countries also decreased since 2015, whereas negative atti-
tudes regarding migration, refugees and asylum seekers increased (Gersemann 2019; 
Zeit Online 2019). A majority in both the West and East of Germany sees it impos-
sible to stem the task of integrating the refugees and migrants having come in the 
last years, in the East slightly more so (Infratest dimap 2019). Furthermore, 52% of 
the people see Islam having too much influence in Germany, and 48% fear their 
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way of life will change too much (Infratest dimap 2019). A study from 2019 finds a 
consolidation of right-wing populism in German society, both in the East and West: 
about 20% of the population have right-wing populist attitudes, and 42% exhibit 
such tendency (Zeit Online 2019). The AfD has gained significant support; many of 
its voters and supporters agree with its strongly “anti-democratic and misanthropic” 
views (Zeit Online 2019). With increases in the number of people supporting illib-
eral statements and questioning equal rights for all people, there is clearly a rupture 
and dislocation of Germany’s self-narrative and identity as tolerant, open state. 
Right-wing populists/extremists have openly contested the meaning of tolerance in 
the context of migration. They were successful in shifting discourse and socie-
tal/political consensus; they did so via representing refugees/migrants as threaten-
ing Other and migration as dangerous development for Germany and Germans, via 
claiming the state’s incapacity, and via appealing to the population to protect them-
selves. Many more Germans now question the dictum that Germany should act in 
solidarity with those in need, that Germany is tolerant and has learned from its past. 
The heated debates in the Bundestag, media or even among normal people on the 
street, and the growing polarization illustrate the unsettling of memory and the crea-
tion of mnemonic insecurity. 
Another element in the creation of mnemonic insecurity by popu-
lists/extremist narratives is the reduced trust in media and politics. A growing num-
ber of people believe more the content of social media sites of particular groups ra-
ther than official government statements or journalistic media reporting. In the last 
years, right-wing extremists/populists have engaged in denouncing media as so-
called mainstream media and Lügenpresse (“lying media”) which collude with the 
state against peoples’ interests, as above illustrated. The use of Lügenpresse, heavily 
used by Nazis during National Socialism (and conservatives before), particularly il-
lustrates how right-wing populists/extremists question German self-narrative and 
memory. With their claims having gained tracked in public and political discourse, 
they have successfully anchored their narratives within broader society, too. When 
we consider how National Socialists in the 1930s/1940s defamed pluralist actors 
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and media, there are still – or again – lessons for today: the grown skepticism of 
media and politics today strengthens the dislocation of German self-narrative and 
identity as open and tolerant state that has learned its lessons from history.  
In the course of events and reactions by society and politics, polarization 
has grown. In light of mnemonic insecurity, Germans are engaged in a struggle over 
the meaning of democracy and tolerance, over their national memory and how to 
live it, over what is taboo and what is possible, and, thus, over what kind of state 
and society they want to be, over their sense of Self. 
 
4. Strengthening Mnemonic Security Again: The Fight of Extremism 
From mid-2019 on, we are seeing political actors beginning to push back 
more broadly and clearly the narratives and demands of right-wing popu-
lists/extremists. Among the key events motivating this change, there are the murder 
of the politician Lübcke and the attack on a synagogue in Halle. These events were 
part of the developments forcing the need to take clear positions and respond to 
hatred and violence. The condemning of acts of violence against Jewish people, ref-
ugees, migrants, and those helping them is now more unified and louder. Citizens in 
many German cities have been organizing demonstrations for tolerance and against 
hatred, too. German politics and society has recognized the dangerous polarization, 
and public and political discourse evidences many more calls for societal cohesion 
and dialogue. We may see all these efforts as aiming for the stabilization of self-
narrative and memory, and thus also for ontological security. The ongoing struggle 
over meaning illustrates that a secure sense of Self needs a coherent, secure 
memory.  
German officials continue to search for workable solutions for the challenge 
of migration, seeking also joint European ones. Germany continues to take in a por-
tion of refugees/migrants arriving. Regulations for asylum-seekers are stricter now, 
while integration measures for those with recognized asylum status were improved. 
Such steps continue as key topic in news reporting, as well as expert and political 
talks, and their contestation continues. However, there is a greater awareness now 
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that online hatred too can incite actual violence. The clearer rejection of hatred, vio-
lence and intolerance by political actors in recent months points to a beginning of 
rebuilding mnemonic security. Statements by high-ranking German politicians, such 
as Federal President Steinmeier and chancellor Merkel, who clearly re-affirm Ger-
many’s historical responsibility and reject the path of hatred are aimed to re-stabilize 
memory and self-narrative, and thereby the German sense of Self as democratic 
state in the world and as tolerant society. Steinmeier, speaking in Yad Vashem in 
January 2020 on Auschwitz, warned “the spirits of evil are emerging in a new 
guise”, and re-affirmed Germany’s responsibility for the horrors of Nazi Germany 
as well as for fighting anti-Semitism in Germany today (Halbfinger et al. 2020). His 
reference to spreading hatred, but also the increase of democracy-critical and anti-
pluralist views, highlight what is at stake.  
The last few years then saw the creation of new federal and national task 
forces and measures against extremist violence and the spreading of hatred online. 
Funding continues for initiatives that foster pluralism and inclusion, at the level of 
civil society, academia and politics. Recently, experts warned that German democra-
cy could destabilize in the coming years, calling for more democracy education, ef-
forts to reduce prejudices, and the recognition and naming of anti-democratic opin-
ions for what they are (Zeit Online 2019). The clear naming of anti-democratic 
views would be a needed element in a successful re-affirming of German self-
narrative as democratic state: clearly distinguishing democratic and anti-democratic 
views draws a clearer boundary towards populists and extremists, and forces to take 
position, thereby having the potential to re-establish mnemonic security and the Self 
as democratic state. 
Measures for de-radicalization and tolerance include counter- or alternative 
narratives: depictions of corrected and alternative, democratic readings of develop-
ments, and of how Germany should deal with them. To this end, a vast array of ini-
tiatives, participatory projects, help centers, information, and teaching material by 
civil society and federal and national institutions exist (for example Radikal 2017; 
BfDT 2019; BpB 2019; Datteltäter; Jugendschutz.net 2019; ufuq.de). Both mne-
Interdisciplinary Political Studies, 6(1) 2020: 21-49, DOI: 10.1285/i20398573v6n1p21 
42 
 
monic security and ontological security should benefit from the acknowledgment of 
existing problems and concerns, and their reading in a liberal-democratic frame, as 
well as when people are touched also at the identity and emotional level. Thus, the 
pluralistic perspectives of those arguing against populists/extremists now evoke a 
more open identity, the value of pluralism, tolerance and their benefit for all, and 
the importance of societal cohesion. They express the idea that all people in Ger-
many can together shape the rules which they want to live by, which has the poten-
tial to re-establish both mnemonic security and ontological security, and to make 
German society and politics more resilient against extremist efforts.  
The still ongoing struggle among political actors and within society over 
memory, self-narrative and identity in Germany is motivating a re-politicization of 
national memory. A stronger and more inclusive debate tries to re-stabilize national 
memory, clearly re-affirming Germany’s special responsibility grounded in history, 
but including now a greater awareness of the strength of lingering racism and re-
sentment. The re-stabilization of memory and the beginning renewal of self-
narrative will re-establish also the sense of Self; ontological security is in the process 
of becoming restored. Having experienced that German democracy and a tolerant 
society need continuous work, the ongoing societal and political debate in Germany 
may result in a sense of Self with an identity that is more secure than in the years 
past. New challenges, however, will continue to test both mnemonic and ontologi-
cal security in Germany. 
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